Beck Peppiatt Limited sought a declaration that the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to determine the claims referred to in the second referral dated 17 February 2003. The Claimant maintained that there was no dispute between the parties at that date. They submitted that the current law with regards to the requirements for a "dispute" in respect of adjudication was unsatisfactory and in conflict.

The first notification of delay was served on 22 February 2002. In April that year the Claimant submitted a claim for an extension of time, and then engaged in June 2002 a claims consultant. Further requests for extensions of time were made, and in August 2002 the Defendant granted a 2 week extension of time. At the same time the Claimant commenced adjudication in respect of 19 claimed variations. Further claims were made and on 1st November the Defendant requested further information in order to substantiate those claims. By a letter dated 18 December 2002 Beck Peppiatt's chairman wrote to the Defendant demanding payment and threatening adjudication if Beck Peppiatt were not paid by the end of January 2003. On 29 January 11 lever arch files were served on the Claimant. On 7 February the Defendant wrote to the Claimant stating that unless the Claimant agreed to the account by close of business on 12 February then they would consider that a dispute had arisen between them. On 17 February the second Referral to Adjudication was issued.

Mr Justice Forbes considered that the present case law in respect of the meaning of a dispute for the purpose of adjudication was not inconsistent with the approach in Halki Shipping Corporation v Sopex Oils Limited [1998] 1 WLR 727. He said that the law was satisfactorily stated by HHJ LLoyd QC in Sindall v Solland [June 2001]. In that case HHJ LLoyd QC stated that:

"For there to be a dispute for the purposes of exercising the statutory right to adjudication it must be clear that a point has emerged from the process of discussion or negotiation that has ended and that there is something which needs to be decided".

Mr Justice Forbes considered that this principle was "easily understood" and was not in conflict with Halki. He therefore concluded that the word "dispute" did not have any special meaning for the purposes of adjudication. He went on to hold (at para 15):

"On any view, as it seems to me, a dispute came into existence from 29 January 2003, if not before, by the Defendant's rejection of the Claimant's position, as put forward in its December 2002 letter, by the service on the Claimant of the Defendant's position with regard to the various items that remained outstanding for the purposes of resolving the final account".

He concluded that a point was reached in February 2003 where the process of discussion and negotiation had ended and the thing that needed to be decided was the correct position with regards to the outstanding final account.