Jim Ennis were employed by Taylor Woodrow as a subcontractor to carry out works on the development of a supermarket in Burnley, Lancashire. Premier were sub-subcontracted to supply, lay and roll the surface of the road. In May 2002, Taylor Woodrow complained about Premier's works and Jim Ennis removed the road. Premier then replaced the road, but there was no agreement as to who was going to pay for this work. In December 2002, Premier included the cost of this work in their final application for payment, however, Jim Ennis refused to pay this cost and deducted a cross-claim for loss and damage in the sum of £39,000.

Premier referred the matter to adjudication in September 2008. This was within six years of the final application for payment, but more than six years since the works had been carried out. The adjudicator awarded Premier the sum of £39,000 plus interest of £14,000. Jim Ennis then commenced court proceedings. Premier argued that the cause of action was statue-barred.

Jim Ennis argued the following:

(1) The decision of the adjudicator gave rise to an independent cause of action which was separate and distinct from the underlying cause of action in respect of the dispute that was submitted to adjudication.
(2) There was an implied term that money paid following an adjudicator's decision can be recovered in later legal proceedings, should those proceedings reach a different result to the adjudicator's decision.
(3) A cause of action in restitution had arisen when the adjudicator's decision was complied with, and Jim Ennis paid the money to Premier. Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply.
(4) Premier was estopped from relying on the limitation defence because it referred the dispute to adjudication more than six years after the breaches of contract that were alleged.
(5) Jim Ennis could not protect itself from Premier's actions, apart from by issuing proceedings for a negative declaration from the court. To find for Premier would throw the construction industry into turmoil by encouraging parties to wait until just before the limitation period before referring disputes to adjudication. It would also be inconsistent with the approach taken by the courts to date.

The Judge held that the obligation to comply with the adjudicator's decision did give rise to a new cause of action in favour of the successful party, to compel the losing party to comply with the decision.

With regard to an implied term, the Judge considered the five conditions for a term to be implied in a contract, as set out in BP Refinery -v- Shire of Hastings were met. The Judge held that such a term was necessary to make fully workable the concept of the temporary finality of the adjudicator's decision. This supported the terms of the Scheme which formed part of the parties' contract.

The Judge held that the cause of action under the implied term could only arise once the losing party had complied with the adjudicator's decision and paid the monies pursuant to that decision. Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980 would apply and the losing party would have six years from the date of payment to bring legal proceedings.

After making these decisions, the Judge did not need to consider the rest of Jim Ennis' submissions. However, in obiter, the Judge discussed that the estoppel argument would have failed, although there was a claim in restitution for the repayment of the money was awarded. The Judge declined to express an opinion as to whether the Limitation Act would apply to the claim in restitution.

Therefore Jim Ennis' claim was not statute-barred.